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Abstract
We study linear properties of TU-games, revisiting well-known issues
like interaction transforms, the inverse Shapley value problem and poten-
tials. We embed TU-games into the model of cooperation systems and in-
fluence patterns, which allows us to introduce linear operators on games in a
natural way. We focus on transforms, which are linear invertible maps, relate
them to bases and investigate many examples (Mo¨bius transform, interac-
tion transform, Walsh transform and Fourier analysis etc.). In particular, we
present a simple solution to the inverse problem in its general form: Given a
linear value Φ and a game v, find all games v′ such that Φ(v) = Φ(v′). Gen-
eralizing Hart and Mas-Colell’s concept of a potential, we introduce general
potentials and show that every linear value is induced by an appropriate po-
tential.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that finite TU-games with n players, and more generally set
functions on a set N of n = |N | elements, form a 2n-dimensional vector space.
Usually, particular attention is paid to two special bases: the set of unanimity
games ζS, S ∈ 2
N , and the set of identity (Dirac) games δS . The coefficients of a
game in the basis of unanimity games are known as the Harsanyi dividends [14],
or the Mo¨bius inverse [20]. But also other transforms (namely, invertible linear
operators) have been proposed and studied in the literature (e.g., the interaction
transform [8], theWalsh transform [23], which is also known as Fourier transform,
etc.).
Although recognized to be important in discrete mathematics, these transforms
are not very well known in the game theory community so far. In fact, it seems
that the linear properties of TU-games–while often used indirectly–have not yet
been fully exploited in game theoretic research in their own right. To the best of
our knowledge, the obvious correspondence between bases and linear transforms
has never been addressed explicitly, for example. As a consequence, the famous
“inverse problem” for TU-games, which asks for a description of all games v′
having the same Shapley value as a given game v, has been solved in a somewhat
tedious way (see Kleinberg and Weiss [17] or Dragan [3, 6]). We solve the inverse
problem for general linear values in Section 3.3.
In our present study of linear properties of game theoretic concepts it is con-
venient (and natural) to embed TU-games into the context of cooperation systems
and influence patterns of coalitions. We introduce this model in Section 2. Linear
transforms and their interplay with bases are investigated in Section 3 and illus-
trated with fundamental examples and applications and relate them to discrete
Fourier analysis.
Hart and Mas-Collel [15] have given an interpretation of the Shapley value
as a potential value which provides an interesting link to the (non-cooperative!)
potential games of Monderer and Shapley [18]. It turns out that a comprehensive
framework for linear potentials as generalizations of transforms exists in the con-
text of cooperation systems. We show in Section 4 how this general framework
allows us to exhibit every linear value as a potential value.
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2 Cooperation systems
In order to set up a suitable context for the analysis of transforms and values,
we extend the classical model of cooperative games to the model of cooperation
systems. We consider finite sets N of n = |N | ≥ 1 players, denoting byN = 2N
the collection of all subsets (or coalitions) S ⊆ N .
A cooperation system is a pair (N,F ), where F : N × N → R is a map
that reflects for every pair (S, T ) of coalitions, the amount F (S, T ) of influence
S exerts on T . We refer to F as the influence pattern of (N,F ). A valuation on
(N,F ) is a map v : N → R that assigns to every coalition S a value v(S). In the
terminology of classical cooperative game theory, a valuation v with v(∅) = 0 is
the characteristic function of a cooperative TU game (N, v).
The valuations v form the 2n-dimensional vector space RN , while the possible
influence patterns F define the vector space RN×N . Mathematically, one may
think of a valuation v ∈ RN as a parameter vector, indexed by the S ∈ N . We
denote the (euclidean) inner product of RN as
〈v, w〉 =
∑
S∈N
vSwS =
∑
S∈N
v(S)w(S).
F ∈ RN×N corresponds to a matrix [fST ] with rows and columns indexed by
the members of N and coefficients fST = F (S, T ). We denote by fS the row
vector of F that corresponds to S ⊆ N and interpret it as the associated influence
function fS : R
N → R with values
fS(T ) = fST = F (S, T ) (T ⊆ N).
2.1 Examples
Counting pattern. Let C = [cST ] ∈ RN×N be the pattern defined by
cST = |S ∩ T |.
Here the individual players act independently. The influence of a coalition S on
another coalition T depends only on the number of players in S that are also
members of T .
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Parity pattern. Let Π = [πST ] ∈ RN×N be the pattern with coefficients
πST = (−1)
|S∩T |.
Π is called the parity pattern. Two coalitions S and T exert a positive (“+1”) or
negative (“−1”) influence on each other depending on whether they have an even
or an odd number of players in common. Π plays a major role in the Fourier anal-
ysis of RN (see Section 3.2 below), which is based on the following fundamental
observation.
Lemma 2.1 For all S, T ⊆ N , one has the orthogonality property
〈πS, πT 〉 =
∑
K⊆N
πSKπTK =
{
2n if S = T ,
0 if S 6= T .
Proof. In the case S = T , one has
〈πS, πT 〉 =
∑
K∈N
(−1)|S∩K|(−1)|S∩K| =
∑
K⊆N
1 = 2n.
So we may assume the existence of some t ∈ T \ S without loss of generality. In
this case, we observe∑
K⊆N\t
(−1)|S∩K|(−1)|T∩K| = (−1) ·
∑
K∋t
(−1)|S∩K|(−1)|T∩K|
and hence
〈πS, πT 〉 =
∑
K⊆N
(−1)|S∩K|(−1)|T∩K| = 0.
⋄
Containment pattern. Let Z = [ζST ] ∈ RN×N be the pattern with the coeffi-
cients
ζST =
{
1, if S ⊆ T
0, otherwise.
Z is the containment pattern, where a coalition S is thought to be able to exert an
influence on any coalition T containing it. For any S ∈ N , the influence function
ζS is (0, 1)-valued. If S 6= ∅, (N, ζS) is commonly known as a unanimity game.
4
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Influence in voting In [12], influence is studied in terms of voting dynamics as
follows. Let S be the set of ’yes’-voters at time t and let mST be the probability
for T to be the set of ’yes’-voters at time t+1. The transition S → T is the result
of a round of discussion among voters. SomST is a measure for the influence the
constellation S exerts on the constellation T . Here, the pattern matrixM = [mST ]
is row-stochastic and defines a Markov process on N .
2.2 Influence spaces, bases and additive games
We define the influence space F of F as the collection of all linear combinations
of influence functions:
F = {v ∈ RN | v =
∑
S∈N
λSfS, λS ∈ R}.
F is a subspace of RN and corresponds to the row space of the matrix F . We
think of parameters vectors v as a row vectors and can therefore have in matrix
notation
F = {vF | v ∈ RN} = RNF.
We state a well-known fundamental linear algebraic fact.
Lemma 2.2 (Basis lemma) Equality F = RN holds if and only if the 2n influ-
ence functions fS are linearly independent and hence form a basis of R
N .
⋄
It is easy to see (see Ex. 2.1 below) that the 2n influence functions (unanimity
games) ζS of the containment pattern Z are linearly independent and hence form a
basis ofRN . The inverse pattern is given by theMo¨bius matrix Z−1 = [µST ] = M
with the coefficients (cf. Rota [20])
µST =
{
(−1)|T\S| if S ⊆ T
0 otherwise.
(1)
On the other hand, the influence functions cS of the counting pattern C are not
linearly independent. Indeed, setting ζi = ζ{i}, we have
ζi = c{i} and cS =
∑
i∈S
ζi for all i ∈ N and S ∈ N \ ∅. (2)
5
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It follows that the n influence functions ζi form a basis of the influence space C
of the counting patternC. In other words, C is the vector space of all characteristic
functions v of the form
v =
∑
i∈N
v({i})ζi or v(S) =
∑
i∈S
v({i}) ∀S ⊆ N.
So C is the n-dimensional space of all additive cooperative games on N .
Example 2.1 Let F = [fST ] be such that for all S, T ∈ N , one has fSS 6= 0 and
fST = 0 unless S ⊆ T . Label the rows and columns of F so that S precedes T
whenever S ⊂ T . This exhibits F as (upper) triangular with non-zero diagonal.
So the 2n influence functions fS are seen to be linearly independent (see Grabisch
et al. [10] and Denneberg and Grabisch [2] for a detailed treatment of this type
of matrix in the context of interaction).
2.3 Linear values
In game theoretic terminology, a value is a function Φ : RN → RN that evaluates
the strength (or power or reward etc.) of player i ∈ N relative to the valuation v as
Φi(v). The valueΦ can be considered as a mappingΦ fromR
N to C, the influence
space of the counting pattern, which assigns to any valuation v an additive game
Φv defined by
Φv(S) =
∑
i∈S
Φi(v) for any S ∈ N \ ∅ (3)
with the convention Φv(∅) = 0. Φ is linear if Φ is a linear map. A classical linear
example is Shapley’s [22] value ΦSh, defined by
ΦShi (v) =
∑
S⊆N
(n− |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
n!
(
v(S)− v(S \ i)
)
(i ∈ N). (4)
In applications, one is often interested in values Φ that satisfy additional con-
ditions. For example, Φ might be required to be efficient in the sense∑
i∈N
Φi(v) = v(N) for all valuations v ∈ RN .
6
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3 Bases and linear transforms
Consider a cooperation system (N,F ) with a full-dimensional influence space
F = RN . Hence, by Lemma 2.2, F is invertible, and the rows fS, S ∈ N , of F
form a basis of RN , yielding for any v ∈ RN a unique representation
v =
∑
S∈N
wSfS,
or in matrix notation v = wF with w the row-vector [wS]S∈N , and consequently
w = vF−1. Following some tradition, one may view the mapping v 7→ w as a
transform, namely a linear and invertible operator on RN with F−1 as its stan-
dard matrix representation (see below for such examples). Letting Ψ be any such
transform v 7→ Ψv, the above observations yield the well-known one-to-one cor-
respondence between bases and transforms:
Lemma 3.1 (Equivalence between bases and transforms) For every basis F of
influence functions fS, there is a (unique) transformΨ such that for any v ∈ RN ,
v =
∑
S∈N
Ψv(S)fS, (5)
whose inverse Ψ−1 is given by v 7→ (Ψ−1)v =
∑
T∈N v(T )fT = vF .
Conversely, to any transform Ψ there corresponds a unique basis F such that
(5) holds, given by fS = (Ψ
−1)δS , where δS is the identity game with δS(T ) = 1 if
S = T and 0 otherwise. ⋄
Game theoretic investigations have traditionally been restricted to the use of
mainly two bases: the basis of identity games and the basis of unanimity games.
For the latter, it is well-known the coordinates of a game are its Harsanyi divi-
dends (see the next section). Lemma 3.1 above, although straightforward from an
abstract linear algebraic point of view, exhibits the general duality between bases
and transforms, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been noticed nor
exploited game theoretically. As a first consequence of the lemma, the use of the
various transforms already existing in the fields of game theory, operations re-
search and computer science, puts at our disposal a variety of new bases for the
analysis of games. It is well known that the choice of a “good” basis can be of
crucial importance. Recall, for example, that the characterization of the Shapley
value by linearity, symmetry, null player and efficiency can be established in a few
lines with the basis of unanimity games. So the knowledge of new bases can be
7
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of considerable help in the study of cooperative games. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 give
many examples of transforms and their associated bases.
A second important consequence is that the solution of the well-known “in-
verse problem”, which asks for finding all games having the same Shapley value
(or other linear value), can be obtained in an elegant way (see Section 3.3 below).
3.1 Examples
Harsanyi dividends and Mo¨bius transform. Harsanyi [14] has shown that a
valuation v admits coefficients mvS (the so-called Harsanyi dividends in game-
theoretic language) such that one has
v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T
mvS =
∑
S⊆N
mvSζS(T ) for all T ⊆ N . (6)
To see that such coefficients exist indeed, just observe that the second equality in
(6) defines the the so-calledMo¨bius transform v 7→ Zv relative to the containment
pattern Z:
v =
∑
S⊆N
mvSζS.
The inverse (Mo¨bius) pattern Z−1 = [µST ], therefore, yields the representation
mv =
∑
S⊆N
v(S)µS
and hence the explicit formula for the Harsanyi dividends:
mv(S) =
∑
T∈N
v(T )µT (S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |v(T ). (7)
The commonality transform. The commonality coefficients mˇvS of a valuation
v were studied by Shafer [21] (see also Grabisch et al.[10]) as parameters with the
property
v(S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
(−1)|T |mˇv(T ). (8)
To demonstrate their existence, we set v˜(S) = (−1)|S|v(N \S) and conclude from
(7) that the numbers v˜(S) must be the Harsanyi dividends of mˇv:
v˜(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |mˇv(T ).
8
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In view of (6), we thus find
mˇv(S) =
∑
T⊆S
v˜(T ) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|T |v(N \ T ). (9)
The commonality transform (or co-Mo¨bius function) is the operator v 7→ mˇv.
From (8), we infer immediately that the basis of the commonality transform con-
sists of the valuations fS with values
fS(T ) =
∑
B⊆N\S
(−1)|B|δS(B) =
{
(−1)|S| if S ∩ T = ∅
0 otherwise.
The Shapley interaction transform. The Shapley (interaction) transform on
R
N is the function v 7→ Iv defined by
Iv(S) =
∑
K⊆N
|N \ (S ∪K)|!|K \ S|!
(n− |S|+ 1)!
(−1)|S\K|v(K).
It extends the Shapley value in the sense
Iv({i}) =
∑
T⊆N\i
(n− |T | − 1)!|T |!
n!
(
v(T ∪ i)− v(T )
)
= ΦShi (v). (10)
It was shown by Grabisch [8] that v can be recaptured from Iv:
v(S) =
∑
K⊆N
β
|K|
|S∩K|I
v(K), (11)
where
βlk =
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
Bl−j (k ≤ l),
and B0, B1, . . . are the Bernoulli numbers. The first values of β
l
k are given in
Table 1.
Using Lemma 3.1, we find that the corresponding basis consists of the 2n
valuations bIT with values
bIT (S) = β
|T |
|T∩S| for all S ∈ N . (12)
9
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k \ l 0 1 2 3 4
0 1 −1
2
1
6
0 − 1
30
1 1
2
−1
3
1
6
− 1
30
2 1
6
−1
6
2
15
3 0 − 1
30
4 − 1
30
Table 1: The coefficients βlk
The Banzhaf interaction transform. The well-known Banzhaf value of a co-
operative game (N, v) is the linear value defined as follows:
ΦBi (v) =
1
2n−1
∑
T⊆N\i
[(v(T ∪ i)− v(T )] (i ∈ N). (13)
REMARK. The value ΦB was introduced by Banzhaf [1] for voting games
(i.e., monotone cooperative games (N, v) with v : N → {0, 1}) and is commonly
known as the Banzhaf power index in the voting context.
Grabisch et al. [10] have extended the Banzhaf value to arbitrary coalitions
S ⊆ N via
IvB(S) =
(1
2
)n−|S| ∑
T⊆N
(−1)|S\T |v(T ), (14)
and thus the property IvB({i}) = B
v
i for all i ∈ N , and have shown that v can be
reconstructed from IvB:
v(S) =
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T\S|
2|T |
IvB(T ) (S ⊆ N). (15)
It follows that the Banzhaf (interaction) transform v 7→ IvB is the linear transform
associated with the 2n basis functions bIBT with values
bIBT (S) =
(−1)|T\S|
2|T |
. (16)
The inversion relation (14)↔ (15) can be verified by direct computation. We
will show below that it follows easily within the setting of game-theoretic Fourier
analysis (and the Walsh transform there, in particular).
10
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REMARK. There is a general theory of interaction values of cooperative games
that includes in particular Owen’s [19] local interaction values (”co-values”) and
their extension to arbitrary subsets by Grabisch and Roubens [11]. As it turns
out all these values are linear and hence fall into the scope of the present model.
We do not go into further details here but refer the reader to Faigle and Voss [7].
The conversion formulas between the transforms presented above were originally
established in [10] (see also a summary in [9]).
3.2 Fourier analysis
Roughly speaking, we mean with ”Fourier analysis” the analysis of valuations in
the context of the parity patternΠ = [πST ] and hence consider the parity transform
v 7→ P v with the property
v(S) =
∑
T∈N
P v(T )πT (S) =
∑
T∈N
(−1)|S∩T |P v(T ) (S ∈ N ). (17)
Because of Π−1 = 2−nΠ (cf. Lemma 2.1), we immediately find
P v(S) =
1
2n
∑
T∈N
(−1)|S∩T |v(T ) (S ∈ N ). (18)
REMARK. The equivalent Hadamard transform v 7→ Hv with Hv = 2n/2P v,
i.e.,
Hv(S) =
1
2n/2
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|S∩K|v(T ) (S ∈ N ) (19)
is self-inverse (i.e., H−1 = H). H is of particular importance in quantum com-
puting, for example, and known as an instance of the discrete (quantum) Fourier
transform (see, e.g., Gruska [13]).
The Walsh transform. Closely related to the parity transform is the Walsh
transform v 7→ W v relative to the modified parity basis functions wS = (−1)|S|πS
and hence the property
v(S) =
∑
T∈N
W v(T )wT (S) =
∑
T∈N
(−1)|T |W v(T )πS. (20)
The functions wS were introduced by Walsh [23] and have the values
wS(T ) = (−1)
|S|(−1)|S∩T | = (−1)|S\T |.
11
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In view of the uniqueness of the transformation coefficients, we have equality
P v(T ) = (−1)|T |W v(T ) and hence deduce from (18):
W v(S) = (−1)|S|P v(S) =
1
2n
∑
T∈N
(−1)|S\T |v(T ) (S ∈ N ). (21)
Recalling the Banzhaf transform (14), we thus observe its intimate connection
with the Walsh transform:
IvB(S) = 2
|S|W v(S) for all S ∈ N . (22)
Moreover, (20) can be re-written in the form
v(S) =
∑
T∈N
IvB(T )2
−|T |wT (S) =
∑
T∈N
IvB(T )b
IB
T (S)
with bIBT (S) = 2
−|T |(−1)|T\S|, as claimed in (16).
REMARK. The Fourier/Walsh approach is particularly appropriate in the con-
text of social choice theory when one thinks of a function f : N → {0, 1} as a
”social choice function”. For example, Kalai [16] has demonstrated that Arrow’s
theorem admits a short proof in this setting.
3.3 The inverse problem
In game theory, the following “inverse problem” is well-known: for a given linear
value Φ and game v, find all games v′ such that
Φ(v) = Φ(v′) or, equivalently, Φ(v − v′) = 0.
This problem was solved1 by Kleinberg and Weiss [17] for the Shapley value by
exhibiting a basis for the associated null space or kernel:
ker(Φ) = {v ∈ RN | Φi(v) = 0 ∀i ∈ N}.
Our linear analysis provides adequate tools for solving the problem easily in
its full generality. We present two approaches, the first one being very simple
1See also Yokote et al. [24] for recent work on this topic, and Dragan [5], who solved this
problem for the Shapley value [3] and later for all semivalues [4] in a simpler way than Kleinberg
and Weiss.
12
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but requiring some extra condition to hold, while the second is applicable in any
situation.
The first construction requires a transform Ψ to be known such that the lin-
ear value Φ in question corresponds to the transform restricted to singletons, i.e.,
Φi(v) = Ψ
v({i}) for every i ∈ N and game v. Using the corresponding basis
{bΨT }T∈N , we can then write:
v =
∑
S∈N
Ψv(S)bΨS =
∑
i∈N
Φi(v)b
Ψ
{i} +
∑
|S|6=1
Ψv(S)bΨS ,
which implies
v ∈ ker(Φ) ⇐⇒ v =
∑
|S|6=1
Ψv(S)bΨS ,
i.e.,
ker(Φ) =
{ ∑
|S|6=1
λSb
Ψ
S | λS ∈ R
}
. (23)
This method can be readily applied to the Shapley and Banzhaf values since
the Shapley and Banzhaf interaction transforms extend these values in the above
sense:
ΦShi (v) = I
v({i}), ΦBi (v) = I
v
B({i}) (i ∈ N).
Example 3.1 Applying the first construction to the Shapley value by means of
the Shapley interaction transform, the representation (23) for valuations v ∈
ker(ΦSh) yields
v(S) =
∑
T⊆N,|T |6=1
λTβ
|T |
|S∩T | for all S ⊆ N .
13
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In the case N = {1, 2, 3}, one thus obtains
v(∅) = λ∅ +
1
6
(λ12 + λ13 + λ23)
v(1) = λ∅ −
1
3
λ12 −
1
3
λ13 +
1
6
λ23 +
1
6
λ123
v(2) = λ∅ −
1
3
λ12 +
1
6
λ13 −
1
3
λ23 +
1
6
λ123
v(3) = λ∅ +
1
6
λ12 −
1
3
λ13 −
1
3
λ23 +
1
6
λ123
v(12) = λ∅ +
1
6
λ12 −
1
3
λ13 −
1
3
λ23 −
1
6
λ123
v(13) = λ∅ −
1
3
λ12 +
1
6
λ13 −
1
3
λ23 −
1
6
λ123
v(23) = λ∅ −
1
3
λ12 −
1
3
λ13 +
1
6
λ23 −
1
6
λ123
v(123) = λ∅ +
1
6
(λ12 + λ13 + λ23).
The second approach allows us to construct a basis for the null space of an
arbitrary linear value Φ : RN → RN . Moreover, while the constructions in the
literature often use the condition dimΦ(RN ) = n, our method is general and
needs no a priori assumption on dimΦ(RN ).
Let k = dimΦ(RN ) ≤ n be the dimension of Φ and recall the well-known
dimension formula for linear maps:
dimker Φ = dimRN − dimΦ(RN ) = 2n − k. (24)
In the case k = 0, one has ker Φ = RN . So any basis of RN solves the inverse
problem for Φ. Let us therefore investigate the non-trivial situation k ≥ 1.
Select a basisE = {e1, . . . , ek} for the rangeΦ(RN ) ofΦ as well as k arbitrary
valuations b1, . . . , bk ∈ RN such that
Φ(bi) = ei (i = 1, . . . , k).
Lemma 3.2 The set {b1, . . . , bk} of valuations is linearly independent.
Proof. Suppose the statement is false and there are non-trivial scalars λi such
that
k∑
i=1
λibi = 0 ∈ R
N and hence Φ(
k∑
i=1
λibi) = 0 ∈ R
N .
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The linearity of Φ then implies 0 =
k∑
i=1
λiΦ(bi) =
k∑
i=1
λiei, which contradicts the
independence of the set E ⊆ RN , however.
⋄
By Lemma 3.2 and basic facts from linear algebra, {b1, . . . , bk} may be com-
pleted to a basis
B = {b1, . . . , bk, bk+1, . . . , b2n}
for the domain RN . Moreover, the basis E for the range Φ(RN ) guarantees, for
each bj ∈ B, j = k + 1, . . . , 2n, unique scalars ǫ
(j)
1 , . . . , ǫ
(j)
k such that
Φ(bj) =
k∑
i=1
ǫ
(j)
i ei =
k∑
i=1
ǫ
(j)
i Φ(bi).
Because Φ is linear, the valuations bΦj = bj −
∑k
i=1 ǫ
(j)
i bi, j = k + 1, . . . , 2
n, are
in ker Φ:
Φ(bΦj ) = Φ(bj)− Φ(
k∑
i=1
ǫ
(j)
i bi) = 0.
We have thus arrived at a solution of the inverse problem.
Theorem 3.1 Let BΦ = {b1, . . . , bk, bΦk+1, . . . , b
Φ
2n}. Then
(i) BΦ is a basis for RN .
(ii) BΦ0 = {b
Φ
k+1, . . . , b
Φ
2n} is a basis for ker Φ.
Proof. Every bj is a linear combination of vectors in B
Φ:
bj = b
Φ
j +
k∑
i=1
ǫ
(j)
i bi (j = k + 1, . . . , 2
n).
Because B generates RN , also BΦ generates RN . Because of |BΦ| = 2n, BΦ is
linearly independent and, therefore a basis, which proves (i).
We have seen that BΦ0 ⊆ ker Φ holds. Since B
Φ
0 ⊆ B
Φ is linearly independent
and |BΦ0 | = 2
n − k = dimker Φ, BΦ0 must be a basis of ker Φ.
⋄
We summarize the procedure to find a basis of the kernel:
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(i) Select a basis E = {e1, . . . , ek} of the range Φ(RN ).
(ii) Find valuations b1, . . . , bk ∈ RN such that Φ(bi) = ei, i = 1, . . . , k.
(iii) Complete the independent set {b1, . . . , bk} to form a basisB = {b1, . . . , b2n}
of RN .
(iv) Compute the coordinates ǫ
(j)
1 , . . . , ǫ
(j)
k of Φ(bj) in E for j = k + 1, . . . , 2
n.
(v) Compute bΦj = bj −
∑k
i=1 ǫ
(j)
i bi for j = k+1, . . . , 2
n, which are the vectors
of the basis of the kernel.
Assume, for example, that Φ satisfies the null player axiom and that Φ(v) is the
null vector only if every player is null. Then Φi(ζ{i}) = αi for some αi 6= 0,
and 0 for every other player. It follows that the basis in step (i) can be chosen as
the set of all unit vectors ei and the vectors bi in step (ii) can be chosen as ζ{i}.
Consequently, it suffices to take the collection of all unanimity games ζS , |S| > 1
to complete the basis in step (iii). Clearly, this works for a large class of linear
values. We illustrate the method below with the Shapley value.
Application: The inverse Shapley value problem revisited. Our general con-
struction includes Dragan’s [3, 6] solution of the inverse problem for the (weighted)
Shapley valueΦSh as a straightforward special case. To see this, consider the basis
B = {ζS | S ∈ N} of R
N . For each i ∈ N , we have
ΦSh(ζi) = ei = ith unit vector in R
N ,
which implies dim ker ΦSh = 2n − n. For each coalition S 6= ∅, we have
ΦSh(ζS) =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
ei =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
ΦSh(ζi) and thus ζ
ΦSh
S = ζS −
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
ζi,
which yields the following set BΦ
Sh
0 as a basis for the null space ker Φ
Sh:
BΨ
Sh
0 = {ζ∅} ∪ {ζ
ΦSh
S | S ∈ N , |S| ≥ 2}.
16
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4 Potential functions and values
Given the cooperation system (N,F ) with influence functions fS , we associate
with every v ∈ RN its F -potential
vF =
∑
S∈N
v(S)fS (= vF in matrix notation). (25)
So the influence space F of F contains precisely the F -potentials:
F = {
∑
S∈F
λSfS | λS ∈ R} = {v
F | v ∈ RN}.
Note that v 7→ vF is a linear operator onRN and is invertible (i.e., every v ∈ RN is
uniquely determined by its F -potential) if and only if the influence functions form
a basis of RN . In such a case, the potential corresponds to an inverse transform
(and hence to a transform in its own right) in the sense of Section 3.
Potentials are closely related to linear values (see Section 2.3). Indeed, a pat-
tern F gives rise to the (linear) potential value ∂F , i.e., a linear map into RN in
the sense of Section 2.3, where
∂Fi (v) = v
F (N)− vF (N \ i) (i ∈ N).
Lemma 4.1 Every linear value Φ arises as the potential value ∂F relative to a
suitable influence pattern F .
Proof. Since v 7→ Φv is a linear map, there is an influence pattern F such that
Φv = vF = vF holds for all v ∈ RN . Hence we find for all i ∈ N ,
Φi(v) = Φ
v(N)− Φv(N \ i) = vF (N)− vF (N \ i) = ∂Fi .
⋄
Although also Lemma 4.1 is a straightforward consequence of linear algebra,
similarly to Lemma 3.1, it permits us a general view and a better understanding
of the theory of potentials (as initiated by Hart and Mas-Colell), relating them to
linear values. As a first consequence, we can derive Hart and Mas-Colell’s well-
known relation between the Shapley value and the potential, in a very simple way
(see Theorem 4.1 below). A second consequence is the insight that any linear
value can be obtained as the Shapley value of some F -potential (Theorem 4.2).
17
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We consider the Shapley value and rewrite (4) in a more general form, where
the game is restricted to the coalitions T contained in S ⊆ N :
ΦShi (v, S) =
∑
T⊆S
(s− t)!(t− 1)!
s!
(v(T )− v(T \ i))
with s = |S| and t = |T |. It is well-known and easy to see that for the influence
functions ζU one has
ΦShi (ζU , S) =
{
1/u if i ∈ U ⊆ S
0 otherwise
(26)
If i ∈ U , then ζU(T \ i) = 0. So the second sum term in the expression for
ΦSh(ζU , S) vanishes and we find for any coalition U 6= ∅,
∑
T⊆S
(t− 1)!(s− t)!
s!
ζU(T ) =
{
0 if U 6⊆ S
1/u if U ⊆ S.
Since v 7→ ΦShi (v, S) is a linear map, the Shapley value (for player i) can be
equivalently defined as the linear functional with property (26) for all coalitions
U . Setting
P v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(t− 1)!(s− t)!
s!
v(T ), (27)
we see:
Theorem 4.1 (Hart and Mas-Colell [15]) For every cooperative game (N, v) and
player i ∈ N one has
ΦShi (v,N) = P
v(N)− P v(N \ i).
Proof. By the linearity of v 7→ ΦShi (v,N), it suffices to verify the Theorem for
potentials of the form v = ζU . If i ∈ U , we have P ζU (N \ i) = 0 and therefore
ΦShi (ζU , N) = 1/u = P
ζU (N)− P ζU (N \ i).
If i /∈ U , we have P ζU (N \ i) = 1/u and thus
ΦShi (ζU , N) = 0 = P
ζU (N)− P ζU (N \ i).
⋄
18
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Let P = [pST ] be the pattern with coefficients
pST =


1 if S = T = ∅
(t− 1)!(s− t)!/s! if T ⊆ S 6= ∅
0 otherwise.
(28)
Then Theorem 4.1 says that the Shapley value is also a potential value in our
sense:
ΦShi (v,N) = P
v(N)− P v(N \ i) = vP (N)− vP (N \ i) = ∂P (v). (29)
In fact, the Shapley value is the ”typical” linear value:
Theorem 4.2 Let Φ be an arbitrary linear value on RN . Then there exists a
pattern G such that Φ arises as the Shapley value relative to G:
Φi(v,N) = Φ
Sh
i (v
G, N) for all v ∈ RN , i ∈ N .
Proof. Notice that the pattern matrix P , given as in (28), admits an inverse
P−1. Indeed, arranging the rows and columns of P so that S always precedes T
if S ⊂ T holds, turns P into a triangular matrix with non-zero diagonal elements
pSS 6= 0.
By Lemma 4.1, Φ arises as the potential value relative to some pattern F .
Letting G = FP−1, we thus obtain for all i ∈ N ,
vF (N)− vF (N \ i) = (vG)P (N)− (vG)P (N \ i) = ΦShi (v
G, N).
⋄
Monderer and Shapley [18] introduced (non-cooperative) potential games and
embedded the Shapley value into the value theory of this class, thus establishing
an important link between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that basic models from linear algebra permit to revisit, extend and
put into perspective many results and concepts of cooperative game theory. In this
respect, the major achievements and “take-home messages” are:
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• Bases of games and linear transforms acting on games (e.g., Mo¨bius trans-
form, Shapley and Banzhaf interaction transforms, Fourier transform) are
two faces of the same coin (Lemma 3.1). Consequently, a plentitude of new
bases for games becomes available, each of them giving a specific repre-
sentation of games which can be useful in practice (e.g., representation of a
game through interaction indices, Fourier coefficients, etc. in Sections 3.1
and 3.2).
• The inverse problem can be solved in an easy way for any linear value. The
solution is particularly simple in the case of Shapley and Banzhaf values
(Section 3.3).
• The Hart and Mas-Colell potential can be generalized and related to any
linear value (Section 4).
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